For citation:
Knyazev, Yu. K. (2021). Objective and Subjective Factors in Modern Economy. Zhurnal Economicheskoj Teorii [Russian Journal of Economic Theory], 18(1), 127-140, https://doi.org/10.31063/2073-6517/2021.18-1.9
Abstract:
The paper focuses on the public sphere in modern economy, which co-exists with the market and develops according to its own, non-market logic. The emphasis is made on the correlation between objective and subjective factors in economy. The author describes the evolution of research on these factors’ role in society, and explains the impact of subjective forces from the perspective of methodological dualism, which combines the principles of individualism and collectivism. The duality of human nature, combining individualist instincts with collectivist values acquired in society, explains substantial differences in people’s behaviour under market conditions and in the public sphere. Subjective and objective factors have different significance in the market and non-market spheres of economy: while the market is driven by objective tendencies, which bring people’s individual actions to a certain common denominator, in the public sphere, on the contrary, the main role is played is managed mainly by objective regularities, which reduce people’s subjective actions to a common denominator, whereas in the public sphere, on the contrary, the leading role is played by subjective understanding of public interests, benefit or harm of certain intentions, and the goals and strategies of further development. In the final part of the article, the key characteristics of the public sphere are described and it is shown that this sphere exists along with the market although it is affected by the market’s demands and, therefore, requires a more in-depth research, including the regulating role of the state in market economy.
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