2021 (18) , №1

Institutional Structure of Corporations (the Case of Large Russian Corporations)

For citation: 

Pletnev, D. A., & Kozlova, E. V. (2021). Institutional Structure of Corporations (the Case of Large Russian Corporations). Zhurnal Economicheskoj Teorii [Russian Journal of Economic Theory], 18(1), 87-102, https://doi.org/10.31063/2073-6517/2021.18-1.6

Abstract:

Modern corporation is the main form of social production but its activity and development still remain a largely underexplored question. Economic theory predominantly relies on simplified approaches based on mathematical modeling to study corporations, which gives us little in-depth understanding of the essence of this phenomenon. On the other hand, applied research on corporations does not rise to the level of theoretically significant generalizations. This paper proposes the following theoretical and methodological approach to analyzing the phenomenon of corporation: we identify institutional elements in its structure — institutions and routines. We use the cases of the largest Russian companies to demonstrate the possibility of using this approach to analyze specific corporations and their aggregates. The paper describes nine different routines that structure corporate actors’ interactions based on social norms, coercion, and private interest. We also conduct an analysis of the official sites of Russian corporations and sites with employee feedback, which leads us to evaluating each institution’s development from the triad: coercion, assistance, and opportunism. We found a significant correlation between the development level of each corporation’s institutional structure and its efficiency (profitability of sales and capitalization growth rate).

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Dmitriy A. Pletnev — PhD in Economics, Associate Professor, Department of Economic Sector and Market, Chelyabinsk State University (Chelyabinsk, Russian Federation; e-mail: pletnev@csu.ru).

Elena V. Kozlova — Senior Lecturer, Department of Economic Sector and Market, Chelyabinsk State University (Chelyabinsk, Russian Federation; e-mail: kozlova@csu.ru).

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