Abstract:
The efficiency of the use of human resources of a group of economic agents is analyzed in terms of the model of collective actions. It is shown that in the case of zero transaction costs, the necessary and sufficient condition to obtain a Pareto efficient outcome is the equitable distribution of the expected income. According to this rule, the share of each agent in the expected aggregate income is equal to its share in the total volume of investments made. In this model, this rule is virtually identical to the principle of socialism: «From each according to his ability, to each according to his work». Therefore, the model shows that the human resource of a group of agents in the case of zero transaction costs and upon the condition of the equitable distribution of the expected total revenue is used efficiently. The absence of transaction costs, as well as in the case of alienated factors of production is a precondition for optimality. The coordination of collective actions at non-zero costs of the contract execution can increase the amount of total advantage vs its equilibrium value, but the optimal value remains unobtainable. Two methods of coordination using negative selective incentives are described in this article. One of them is based on the application of the potential for violence, and the second one is based on the application of penalties.
