For citation:
Biryukov, V. V. (2026). Institutional Alternatives of Macroeconomic Policy in the Context of a Change in the World Economic Order. AlterEconomics, 23(1), 42–65. https://doi.org/10.31063/AlterEconomics/2026.23-1.4
Abstract:
In the context of a changing world economic order, one central topic of discussion is the problem of choosing an effective model of macroeconomic policy. This article examines alternative directions for this model: the mainstream direction, based on an institutionally neutral approach, and the unorthodox direction, based on the value-institutional approach and the ideas of J. Keynes. The study explores the features of the institutional evolution of macroeconomic policy, including the use of the Keynesian model of financial and monetary coordination in developed economies during the “golden period” of capitalism and the subsequent global transition to neoliberal macroeconomic policy. This transition was based on the theoretically and empirically unproven myth that a central bank institutionally independent from the government can pursue an effective inflation targeting policy. In the context of economic globalization, this myth legitimized the dependence of central banks on the interests of large capital owners and the loss of sovereignty in developing and developed economies.The institutional structure of macroeconomic policy gives rise to the dominance of monetary and credit policy over financial policy. It turns the central bank into the main macro-regulator of the national economy, whose institutional status does not allow for satisfactory coordination of financial and monetary processes. As a result, institutional and structural imbalances increase, the positions of developed countries in the global economy deteriorate, there is a loss of legitimacy of the global project, and the mandate for the independence of the central bank erodes. The study argues for the need to change the institutionally archaic model of macroeconomic policy used in Russia, which has led to a macro-institutional trap that generates a regime of high inflation and low, unstable economic growth. The author advocates for a sovereign Post-Keynesian model that regulates aggregate supply, demand, and inflation to sustain long-term investment and innovation in the face of new challenges.
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